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Vichy replaced "liberty, equality, fraternity" with "work, family, country." Several of the essays analyze the collaborationist regime according to this premise. Rémi Dalisson examines the importance of labor festivals held in the workplace, but describes these celebrations as "introducing the Pétainist and corporatist wolf," making the workplace a site of controversy over Vichy policies (p. 464). The Vichy regime attributed much of the blame for the defeat of France to the breakdown of gender order, and it championed pronatalist policies, which were predicated on women producing children rather than working for wages. However, the demands made by the Germans on the French economy, when large numbers of Frenchmen were held in prisoner-of-war camps or were drafted to work in Germany, forced firms in occupied France to employ more women. Marie-Claude Albert notes that, unlike the situation in World War I when a spirit of patriotism encouraged women to work, during the occupation the only spur, powerful though it was, was economic necessity. Nor was Vichy able to defend the nation's interests, as represented by workers in France. Lars Hellwinkel tells us that when workers in French marine arsenals laboring for Germany died in Allied bombings, the Vichy French navy informed the workers' families that they should consider the victims as having been honored because they "died for France." Germany forbade French employers to make across-the-board salary increases, and saw to it that French workers employed by German companies in France and Germany were better paid than those hired by French enterprises.

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dependent, offering occasions to strengthen ties between employers and employees. French companies did what they could to counter the higher wages paid by German employers, operating cafeterias and cooperatives and creating worker gardens to supplement the scarce food supply in France. Collaboration with employees was in line with Vichy ideology and was rooted in existing paternalist customs, but the practice could run counter to the collaboration that Germany decreed. Nowhere was this clearer than in employers' efforts to protect their workers from the STO as their interest in maintaining a labor force meshed with workers' desire to remain in France. The ambiguity emerges when a firm's management is the subject of more than one essay: while Raphaël Spina notes that the director of Châtelleraut was "hated for his *quasi ubuesque* authoritarianism" (p. 95), Albert passes over such characterizations in her essay on women workers there; Christophe Capuano recognizes that Charles Schneider's renowned paternalism at Le Creusot was insufficient to deal with the hardships of the occupation, but his portrait of a director who cooperated with the French resistance to end the bombardment of his factories is more sympathetic than Françoise Berger's treatment of Schneider's management.

Resistance and collaboration have long been the tropes around which accounts of the occupation have been organized, but the actions of both employers and their employees in this period require a rethinking of these concepts. Some managers became engaged in the organized resistance, but the contributors to this collection are more concerned with how firms tried to resist constraints imposed by Germany. As Jean-Pierre Harbulot shows, this understanding of resistance as a form of inertia also offers more insight into workers' relations with authority during the occupation than the study of resistance movements alone. Many workers fought deportation to Germany, but were willing to work for German military interests, as long as they could do so in their own home factories. More than anything, the STO broke worker passivity; in this context, Spina quotes an engineer at Renault who spoke of "a contagion of resistance as there is one of defeatism" (p. 96).

Dichotomous representations of wartime activities characterized the collective memory of the occupation that developed after the war. In his excellent study of the pay of French workers in Germany, Patrice Arnaud critically examines workers' memories of that time, developed in this context to counter charges that they had profited from the experience. Marie-Noëlle Polino explains that the collective memory fostered after the war kept no place for the railway men who had been requisitioned to work in Germany. Such ambiguities emerged during the post-war trials for collaboration. Ludovic Laloux shows how a firm that operated profitably through the war making materials for German railways

escaped prosecution by citing efforts to prevent its workers from being subject to the STO.

The terminology used to characterize Vichy France is inadequate to analyze the history of business during the occupation. It is a testament to the diversity encompassed by this study that it reveals the limitations of conceptual frameworks rooted in narrative political history. The best direction to proceed, as suggested in several of these studies, would be to examine the different chronologies and narratives of business history, allowing the traumatic events of the occupation to take on new meanings as they are viewed over the long term. Some would then appear as isolated aberrations; others, as extreme situations that would reveal the fundamental nature of economic actors and organizations.

Donald Reid is professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of Germaine Tillion, Lucie Aubrac, and the Politics of Memories of the French Resistance (2007) and is completing a study of the libertarian communist, Daniel Guérin.

The Company That Changed Itself: R&D and the Transformations of DSM. *By Arjan van Rooij.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007. 279 pp. Figures, tables, appendix, notes, bibliography. Paper, \$34.95. ISBN: 90-526-0138-0.

Reviewed by Kees Boersma

The Company That Changed Itself is not a history of research and development (R&D) per se, but is, rather, an account of the changes that took place at DSM, a large chemical plant in the Netherlands, from around 1910 to 1990. The question of whether a company can change itself—a possibility suggested by the title—is a difficult one, and attempts to find the answer can lead to misunderstanding. Any study of organizational change must ask, “What are the ‘motors of change?’” “Who are the ‘change actors?’” and—finally—“Is a company capable of changing itself (without the help of others)?” A reader judging the book on the basis of its title could fault Van Rooij for succumbing to reification, since only human actors, not organizational structures, are capable of changing an organization. The title also suggests that Van Rooij’s analysis is based on *internalism*, which is to say that he has attached too much weight to the firm’s internal development. Organizational development, however, is never a matter of isolated internal forces, but is always intertwined with many factors in the organizational environment.

A careful reading shows that Van Rooij is aware of these pitfalls, as

experiences and spaces of consumption" (p. 99). The London of the ABC and Lyons was, however, fundamentally different from the city contained within *Vogue's* vision of the West End—geographies of selling and consumption, after all, are not purely physical. In the final essay in this section, Victoria Morgan seeks to follow the retail experience as it leaks out "beyond the boundary of the shop." Her time and space are early eighteenth-century provincial England, and her primary sources are retail advertising. She argues that increasingly innovative forms of advertising not only demonstrated shopkeepers' modernity, professionalism, and respectability, but also breached the physical bounds of the shop to create "an abstract consumer space that we can only suppose acted on consumers' minds" (p. 79). While I was not always convinced by her presentation of this argument, it is nonetheless intriguing and provocative.

In the second section, the focus shifts from geographies of the retailing-consumption nexus to what might be thought of as some of its costs: literal, social, and perhaps even psychological. Dil Porter examines so-called financial bucket shops in the City between 1880 and 1939. These were outfits that exploited gullible, or perhaps greedy, investors through offers of often worthless stocks and shares. Fueled by the rising number of joint-stock companies offering shares, bucket shops flourished during the late-nineteenth century, but they, almost inevitably, attracted critiques and, eventually, regulation. Clive Edwards adopts a long-run perspective on the use of credit in furniture, and he ends with the straightforward conclusion that, after three centuries of usage, "many consumers and retailers seem to think credit . . . [is] the best way to buy and sell furniture" (p. 152). And not without good reason, as furniture purchases are typically episodic and involve relatively large outlays. Avram Taylor follows this essay with an exploration of the working-class experience of credit as a basis for consuming during the interwar years. Empirically rich, this chapter presents a nuanced picture of working-class consumption during economically straitened times. Thus, whereas the first section gives us the glittering spectacle of innovative forms and spaces of retailing, the second pulls back the curtain on some of its darker aspects.

The final section takes up the changing experience of being a salesperson, whether in a British department store post 1945 (Joy Cushman), in a beleaguered East German store in the dog days of communism (Christina Schröder), or as a small shopkeeper in seventeenth-century England bombarded by the advice contained in a plethora of pamphlets and books (Elizabeth Anne Rothenberg). Taken together, these three chapters work well to show the shop owner, shop worker, and salesperson doing difficult work at the meeting point of selling, buying, and

consuming. A further chapter by Susan Lomax considers the evolution of attitudes to window dressing in English stores during the first half of the twentieth-century. I felt that this chapter, interesting though it was, might have been placed to better advantage in the first section on spaces of retailing and consumption. The author also misses a trick in not referencing H. G. Wells's *The History of Mr. Polly*, in which a "radical" approach to window dressing leads to a marvelously comic fight and a firing.

Is this book, though, as its title would suggest, really about "cultures of selling"? I'm not fully convinced. This is not, however, to diminish either its value or its interest, but to question its degree of focus. The editors' introduction to the subject describes the increasingly rich historiography of retailing and consumption in Britain. They suggest three principal themes: the commodity, the profits, and the consumer. But, strangely, these themes do not map easily onto the three sections that comprise the book itself. Nor do I think that the concept of "cultures of selling" is explored with sufficient rigor in the introduction. Nonetheless, the editors are justified in their claim that the book, taken as whole, is successful in demonstrating how the terrain of selling, buying, and consuming has been long been contested, riddled with ambiguities, and subject to often conflicting forces. For a nation of shopkeepers (and hence, one must assume, shoppers), the British remain surprisingly ambivalent about the retail experience—a legacy perhaps of the rich and often compelling histories uncovered here. The editors are to be thanked for bringing this collection together.

Andrew Popp is senior lecturer in business history at the University of Liverpool Management School. He has published on British business history, particularly on the history of the North Staffordshire potteries and other English industrial districts. He is currently researching the history of commercial travelers in Britain.

Travailler dans les entreprises sous l'Occupation [Working in Businesses under the Occupation]. Edited by Christian Chevandier and Jean-Claude Dalmas. Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007. 523 pp. Tables, notes. Paper, €15.00. ISBN: 978-2-848-67211-3.

Reviewed by Donald Reid

This collection of twenty-eight essays is the fruit of colloquia organized by a research group devoted to the study of French business during the German occupation. (For information on the activities of this group,